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Seeking Global Reform: The United Nations Security Council, the International Criminal 
Court, and Emerging Nations 
 
 
Ezequiel Jimenez 
 
 
 
It is impossible to know a man’s soul, both the wit and the will, before he writes 
laws and enforces them. I believe that he who rules in a state and fails to embrace 
the best men’s councils, but stays locked in silence and vague fear is the worst 
man there.
1
 
Sophocles 
 
It is time for political actors to adjust to the law. We have no police and no army, 
but we have legitimacy. We will prevail.
2
 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, International 
Criminal Court Prosecutor 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles created an international tribunal in order to prosecute Kaiser 
Wilhelm II for initiating the First World War.
3 
However, the Kaiser sought refuge in the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and Queen Wilhelmina Helena Pauline Maria refused to cooperate 
with the new tribunal or surrender her cousin to the Allied Powers.
4
 Much has changed in the 
Netherlands since. As a pioneer country in the advancement of human rights, the Netherlands has 
participated actively in the development and enforcement of multiple treaties and conferences 
 
 85 
hosted by the United Nations. Today, the city of The Hague is proud to call itself an 
“international city of Peace and Justice.”5 Indeed, The Hague is the host of multiple international 
courts;
6
 evidencing the Netherlands commitment to protect human rights. The International 
Criminal Court (ICC) is one of the most prominent institutions the Netherlands honorably hosts.  
   In July 1998, after the creation of the ICC, then-U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan affirmed 
that, “the Court is a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule 
of law.”7 The Rome Statute, ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo argues, “is an innovative 
legal design, a twenty-first century institution modeled to address the threats and challenges of 
the twenty-first century.”8 The creation of a permanent court dealing with the most horrific 
crimes in the world, according to legal scholar and Judge Antonio Cassese, “signals the will of 
the international community to break with the past, by punishing those who have deviated from 
acceptable standards of human behavior.”9 However, in the context of accelerated globalization 
and the increasingly popular rhetoric of human rights protection as stipulated in international 
law,
10
 the interaction of the Court with highly politicized organizations such as the United 
Nations Security Council has been detrimental for global justice.
11
 Three out of the five 
permanent members of the Council have not joined the ICC but still can veto any decision 
related to the court. This act by the Security Council lacks substantial legitimacy to guard global 
justice. As in the case of Darfur, the Council’s involvement with the Court has considerably 
undermined the impartiality and legality of the proceedings.
12
 Unfortunately, as First Registrar of 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Theo van Boven
13
 notes, “The ICC is a step 
forward, but it is certainly not yet functioning as a guardian of global justice.”14 
   Nonetheless, backed by their economic prowess and determination to support the project of 
global justice based on the fulfillment of human rights, emerging nations might promote reform. 
Nations like Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) could play an active role in rebalancing the 
current world order
15
 to achieve future reform of old centers of power.
16
 Although it is clear that 
both Russia and China need to improve their human rights records, their support of an agenda of 
global rebalancing could change the current status quo. In this vein, this essay argues that backed 
by the BRIC’s conglomerate, Brazil’s multilateralism17 might foster the reform of the Security 
Council and subsequently the needed restructuring of the ICC. 
   This essay will focus on two main questions. First, it will explore how and through which 
mechanisms the interaction between the ICC and the Security Council undermines global justice 
and maintains the current delegitimized dominant order. Here, the essay will address the 
Council’s Darfur Resolution 1593. Secondly, it will analyze and localize the increasing role that 
emerging nations have in connection to institutional reform, especially with the case of BRIC 
and more specifically, Brazil. These two questions are of crucial importance, as the ICC will 
undergo a change of leadership by the end of 2011.
18
 After a decade of slow and meticulous 
work, this might be an opportunity for the Court to reassess its actions. In addition, as the Court 
becomes increasingly recognized internationally, the role of emerging nations in an ever-
changing geopolitical scenario could trigger the desired change.
 
   This essay first discusses the notion of global justice in an effort to locate and define the 
debates about the ICC and the current world order. It then draws upon an interview with 
Professor Emeritus of International Law at Maastricht University and head of the Dutch 
delegation to the Rome Conference, Theo van Boven. As a fundamental actor in the negotiations 
representing the Dutch interests, this interview will provide a detailed background about the 
Rome Statute negotiations and early controversies on the role of the Security Council. To 
demonstrate the Security Council’s detrimental influence on the Court, the essay examines the 
ways in which the Council manipulated judicial mechanisms in the case of Darfur through 
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Resolution 1593. Finally, the essay will assess the role emerging nations might play in reshaping 
global justice. 
 
II.  Seeking Global Justice 
 
This section deals with the problematique of defining global justice in the context of accelerated 
globalization and expanding inequalities. Departing from ethical definitions of global justice 
coined by authors such as Thomas Pogge, Peter Singer, and Richard Miller, I will seek to explain 
the importance of rebalancing international politics with specialized institutions insofar as they 
practice “justice,” in the Rawlsian sense, as “the first virtue of social institutions.”19 To reach this 
Rawlsian vision of global justice, the United Nations Security Council and the ICC must undergo 
deep institutional reforms. 
   The configuration of the Security Council not only mirrors the political and economic reality of 
1945, but it is also an increasingly delegitimized center of power. On the other hand, the ICC’s 
lack of total independence from politicization as well as statutory limitations threatens its 
primary objective of protecting individuals from abuse of power.
20 
Therefore, these two global 
institutions urgently need to reform their backward and obsolete interpretation of power that only 
perpetuates the status quo.
21 
In seeking transcendental reform for the sake of global justice, the 
role of emerging nations, especially the BRIC contingent explored later in this article, must be 
taken into careful consideration.
22
 However, first we need to explain the role the ICC plays in 
enhancing global justice.  
 
A.  The Current World Order: The Age of Transition 
 
According to Immanuel Wallerstein, the international order is in the midst of an age of 
transition.
23
 The so-called A-phase, or les trente glorieuses, of a Kondratieff cycle
24
 has been 
completed.
25
 The United States’ dominance over both the order of international organizations 
and international politics is threatened by a severe crisis inside capitalism.
26
 Beginning with the 
establishment of the “Washington Consensus,” trade liberalization and free market economies, 
vast inequalities, and financial crises have weakened the current world-system. Wallerstein 
argues, therefore, for the creation of a new system intrinsically related to human intervention and 
creativity,
27
 a system, which “will be significantly more democratic and more egalitarian.”28 
   Wallerstein’s argument is intimately related to the production and reproduction of global 
injustice rendered by economic transactions. Keith Griffin, a development economist, notes that 
the penetration of market forces into every domain, including politics, culture, and even our 
global climate, has only impaired the bottom million’s ability to escape poverty.29 For example, 
in the period from 1980 to 1991, 14 percent of the world’s population accounted for 80 percent 
of investment flows and in 1992, for 70 percent of the world’s trade.30 Griffin further argues that 
even in times of accelerated globalization, our ability to fulfill the “unmet responsibilities”31 
toward those who are being exploited are ineffective and precarious.
32 
Globalization is uneven; it 
does not refer to a global level playing field of symmetrical international relations, but a scheme 
of exploitation exercised by the few and imposed on the many. 
   In this context, the enhancement of basic and universal human rights is central to protect those 
disadvantaged by the current political and economical system. As political theorist David Held 
and international law expert Antonio Franceschet argue, equality, respect for the law, and 
democracy can only be achieved in a post-Westphalian world that guarantees freedoms and 
rights for all, irrespective of nationality or origin.
33
 In this framework, heightened inequality 
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violates social and political rights. Insofar as international treaties and conventions are “rarely 
enforced for their own sake, governments will be tempted to violate, abrogate or reinterpret 
them.”34 Hence, a future world order must be closely related to a cosmopolitan project based on 
shared values with enforceable mechanisms. Thomas Pogge, therefore, argues for a rights-based 
approach to both institutional reform and an inclusive international modus vivendi. 
   The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 28,
35
 vows to create a world order in 
which all clauses stipulated in the Declaration are effectively enforced. Hence, if the 
“institutional order avoidably fails to fulfill human rights, then those of its members who do not 
support the requisite of institutional reform are violating a negative duty of justice: the duty not 
to cooperate in the imposition of an unjust institutional order.”36 What Article 28 and the human 
rights approach arrive at is the need for a strong political will for a world order that supports the 
emergence and stability of democratic, rights-respecting, and peaceful regimes. A qualitatively 
new regime could effectively reduce radical deprivations and inequalities.
37
 Therefore, the notion 
of global justice as human rights protection practiced by the ICC should be strengthened in order 
to achieve a new international order. 
 
B.  The International Criminal Court: Towards Global Justice? 
 
The Rome Statute of the ICC upholds the responsibility to pursue justice when the most brutal 
crimes against humanity occur. The ICC Statute pledges: “The most serious crimes of concern to 
the international community must not go unpunished.”38 The novel mechanism to exert 
jurisdiction over state parties to the treaty intends to enforce international law to protect human 
rights. Nonetheless, the ICC’s ability to pursue its objectives remains tethered to politicization 
and dependency. The United Nations Security Council, explored later in this essay, can limit the 
ICC’s scope when investigating gross human rights violations. However, the creation of the 
Court is an important achievement of international law. The Court has the potential to 
materialize the project of global justice, imparting and defending human rights in states 
incapacitated or unwilling to protect individuals within their borders.
39
 However, the element of 
power politics embedded in states’ interests might cripple the ICC’s objectives. 
   Franceschet’s critical model, originated from Marxist thought, offers useful mechanisms to 
transcend power politics. The model seeks to determine both the source of oppression and the 
relationship between dominant legal norms and emancipatory politics.
40
 The recognition of the 
marriage between high politics and the reform of the world order is evident in the workings of 
the Court. However, the ICC as an institution of global justice should utilize its capacity to 
influence the exercise of politicized justice into an emancipatory project for equality. Indeed, the 
Court’s practice of international law as a regulative idea can engender a new world order. The 
Court’s application of international law and juridical decisions can help the law evolve to the 
point of “supporting different political orientations towards world order.”41 Therefore, the ICC is 
also a reflection of “changing perceptions of how the rule of law relates to larger problems of 
global inequality.”42 Thus, the ICC’s role in reforming world order by protecting human rights 
and changing the practice of international law moves humanity closer to the condition of global 
justice. 
   In addition, the ICC as an institution for global justice can advance a cosmopolitan project. The 
Court vows to eliminate the disorder and violence caused by “structural pathologies”43 in 
international relations that threaten human rights. During the negotiation of the Rome Statute, 
multiple actors engaged in consultations to curb human rights violations. Non-governmental and 
international organizations, together with states, actively participated in all debates over disputed 
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clauses.
44
 Although some states had a greater capacity to influence the final text,
45
 the process of 
negotiation was overall open and frank.
46
 It drew upon the active participation of diverse actors 
and was later ratified by willing states.
47 
   The ICC, therefore, reinforces the idea that “peace and legal order must guide interstate politics 
rather than merely a balance of power and realpolitik.”48 The ICC as a global institution bears the 
unique mandate to embody the needed reform in the current world order as reflected in the Rome 
Statute’s preamble. However, political will must accompany the ICC’s effort to protect human 
rights. An inadequate response by global leaders to urgent reform could be noted as “the ultimate 
crime against peace and justice.”49 In this context, world leaders gathered in Rome sought to 
create the first permanent international criminal court to guarantee justice. 
 
III.  The Establishment of the International Criminal Court 
 
The creation of the International Criminal Court was a tedious process. The creation of an 
international criminal court that ultimately culminated in the Rome Conference faced much 
resistance by geopolitical realities adverse to the idea of global justice. Finally, in 1998, the 
member states gathered in Rome enacted the ICC Statute, but it was not without flaws. This 
section explores the complicated history of the 1998 Rome Conference.  
 
A.  The Road to Rome 
 
The Rome Statute came into force on July 1, 2002, after sixty countries ratified the treaty, giving 
the International Criminal Court enough signatory members to become operational.
50
 As of 
January 2012, the Rome Statute counts 119 states.
51
 However, the establishment of a world 
criminal court did not commence in 1998. In 1872, Gustave Moynier, one of the founders of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, envisaged a court to deter violations of the First 
Geneva Convention related to the amelioration of the condition of the wounded in armies in the 
field.
52
 In 1919, as explained in the introduction, the ad hoc tribunal created by the Allied powers 
failed.
53
 After the Second World War, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and for 
the Far East in Japan prosecuted major Nazi and Japanese officials for war crimes, crimes against 
peace, and crimes against humanity.
54
 However, despite the adherence of the other nineteen 
countries, only the four victor powers took part in the prosecution and punishment.
55
 
   On December 8, 1948, a few days before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution requiring the International Law 
Commission (ILC) to study the establishment of a “Criminal Chamber of the International Court 
of Justice”56 in response to an “increasing need of an international judicial organ.”57 In 1951 and 
1953, two successive ad hoc committees submitted to the General Assembly drafts of a 
permanent criminal court, but the Cold War’s escalating political and military tensions closed the 
window of opportunity to adopt any draft.
58
 In 1989, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and before 
the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, President Arthur Napoleon Raymond Robinson of 
Trinidad and Tobago renewed the call on the international community to establish a permanent 
criminal court.
59
 The proposal was welcomed as an attempt to transcend the ideological debate 
and to tackle ethnic tensions arising from the collapse of the U.S.S.R.
60
 
   The General Assembly required the ILC to study the situation, but the rising escalation of 
violence in Yugoslavia and subsequently Rwanda demanded an immediate response. Thus, the 
international community created two ad hoc tribunals under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. In 1994, the General Assembly decided to pursue work towards a permanent criminal 
court as it tackled multiple legal and political issues with the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals. 
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The ILC draft for a permanent international criminal court concluded, “The new court was to 
conform to principles and rules that would ensure the highest standard of justice.”61 In 1995, the 
General Assembly decided to form the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), inviting member 
states and non-governmental and international organizations to plan for a Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. In 1998, the 
PrepCom presented to the General Assembly the “Zutphen Draft,” carrying all the amendments 
to the ILC draft that opened the way for a high-level meeting during the summer of 1998 in 
Rome. 
   The making of the ICC is the result of a historical process marked by frustration, power 
politics, and impotence. The 1998 Rome Statute
62
 is, as Antonio Cassese argues, “a 
revolutionary institution that intrudes into state sovereignty by subjecting states’ nationals to an 
international criminal jurisdiction.”63 
 
B.  The Rome Conference 
 
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court was a unique forum for deliberation. According to Theo van Boven, 
the interaction between member states’ delegates, international organizations, and non-
governmental agencies was “enriching.”64 Furthermore, the unique urgency of the conference 
facilitated compromise for the final establishment of the Court.
65
 In his opening statement, 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on states “not to flinch from creating a Court strong and 
independent enough to carry out its task.”66 
   However, issues concerning the Court’s independence from the U.N. Security Council and the 
role of the prosecutor threatened the conference with failure.
67
 The political initiative of the 
“Like-Minded-Group,”68 led principally by the conference’s Bureau of the Whole Chair Philippe 
Kirsch,
69
 successfully articulated contested articles into solutions supported by most states. 
Diplomats from the Netherlands particularly pushed for concessions representing the overall 
agreement among nations. Without the stewardship of the Netherlands, the conference could 
have failed. The final package, presented the last day of the conference, tried to bridge 
disagreements over the Court’s jurisdiction and the role of the prosecutor.70 Envisaged in Article 
13 of the Rome Statute, the Court’s jurisdictional trigger mechanisms included a referral by the 
Security Council and parties to the Statute. In addition, it gave the prosecutor the ability to start 
his or her own investigation, also known as the proprio motu clause.
71
 Departing radically from 
proposed Article 23,
72
 in the 1994 ILC draft, the Security Council no longer had the sole 
discretionary power to refer a matter to the Court. 
   Despite strong opposition from the United States, Russia, and China, the role of an independent 
prosecutor was backed by most countries in order to enable the Court to remain apolitical. 
According to Dutch political scientist Marlies Glasius at the University of Amsterdam, the role 
of an independent prosecutor was one of the victories of the Rome Conference.
73
 The proprio 
motu clause guaranteed the Court’s independence and aimed to investigate suspected individuals 
from state parties to the Statute without interference from the Security Council. Still, pressure 
from the Security Council’s five permanent members (P-5) succeeded in including Article 16, 
the power to defer any investigation by the prosecutor for twelve months, with a renewal 
possibility each year with a resolution under Chapter VII.
74 
 
  This move was strongly rejected by the Non-Aligned Group, led by India, Egypt, and Mexico. 
These states were suspicious and unwilling to subject the Court to the Security Council, “which 
they believed could not be relied upon to administer justice in an impartial manner.”75 On June 
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17, 1998, Dilip Lahiri, head of the Indian delegation, warned against the preponderant role of the 
Security Council. For Lahiri, the role of the Council represented a “violation of equality before 
the law because the five veto-wielding States are above the law and thus possess de jure 
impunity from prosecution, while individuals in all other states are presumed to be prone to 
committing such international crimes.”76 Indeed, under Article 16, the veto-wielding members of 
the Security Council can defer a situation indefinitely to protect their interests, or in the case of 
the United States, their military personnel abroad.
77
 At the same time, as in the case of Darfur, 
the Council can refer a case to the ICC’s prosecutor under Article 13 even if the referred state is 
not a signatory party of the Rome Statute. However, for the conference not to fail, the Bureau of 
the Whole had to compromise its political positions in the last draft. On July 18, 1998, the Rome 
Statute was enacted by a vote of 120 countries in favor, 7 opposed, and 21 abstained.
78 
   The Court became operational in 2003 and opened its first case in 2004, after Uganda referred 
the situation of the Lord’s Resistance Army to the court. In March 2012, the Court delivered its 
first verdict finding Thomas Lubanga of the Democratic Republic of Congo guilty of 
conscripting child soldiers.
79
 Nevertheless, while recognizing that this Court is a historic step 
forward for international justice, organizations such as Amnesty International agreed that, “the 
statute still requires radical surgery to ensure that the court will be just, relevant and effective.”80 
Indeed, for the Court to envisage global justice, its relationship with the Security Council must 
be revised in order to avoid a future situation of “dual justice,” as seen in the case of Darfur. 
 
IV. The International Criminal Court and the Security Council: The Case of Darfur 
 
After the Court became operational, the process of case initiation through trigger mechanisms 
became complex and politically sensitive.
81
 The self-referral of Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in 2004 and that of the Central African Republic in 2005
82
 served as tests of 
the Court’s functioning. Acting under Article 15 of the Rome Statute, the prosecutor, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, started his own investigations indicting various political leaders, such as 
Joseph Kony,
83
 head of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. However, with Resolution 1593, 
the case of Darfur became the first situation referred by the Security Council under Article 13 of 
the Rome Statute, in accordance with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 
 
A.  Background: The Cassese Report and Recent Developments  
 
In January 2005, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564, the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur, chaired by Antonio Cassese, recommended that the Council refer the case 
(under Article 13) to the ICC on the grounds of gross violation of international humanitarian 
law.
84
 The Commission found that, “Government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate 
attacks…on a widespread and systematic basis” amounting to crimes against humanity.85 
However, the Commission did not accuse parties to the conflict of pursuing a policy of 
genocide,
86
 recognizing that this was a “determination that only a competent court can make on a 
case by case basis.”87 
   Therefore, the Security Council, with Resolution 1593, referred the situation of Darfur to the 
prosecutor of the ICC.
88
 In 2008 and 2009, the prosecutor, although facing accusations of being 
exceedingly “prudent,”89 submitted an application for an arrest warrant for President Omar 
Hassan al-Bashir.
90
 In 2009 and 2010, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I charged Sudan’s President 
with genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
91
 President al-Bashir became the first 
head of state indicted by the ICC, discarding official immunity as protection against 
prosecution.
92
 Despite criticism by African leaders and the subsequent call for the Security 
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Council to defer the case against Sudan under Article 16,
93
 the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued two 
arrest warrants for President al-Bashir, exhorting state parties to cooperate with his capture.
94
 
Nevertheless, al-Bashir has been able to travel to countries that are state parties to the ICC 
without facing any attempted arrests. This situation led the ICC prosecutor, in his bi-annual 
report to the Security Council in December 2010, to call for enforcement measures to bring al-
Bashir into custody.
95
 Recently, the Pre-Trial Chamber I required Malawi to explain its failure to 
arrest Sudan’s President after he visited on October 15, 2011.96 
 
B.  Resolution 1593: Exclusive Jurisdiction and Victor’s Justice 
 
The inherent problem with the case of Darfur is not the lack of an enforcement mechanism by 
the Court, but the legitimacy and validity of Security Council Resolution 1593, referring Sudan 
to the ICC. Despite the responsibility of the Security Council to maintain international peace and 
security, certain elements of the political manipulation of judicial mechanisms (under paragraph 
6 of the Resolution) could reveal a situation of “victor’s justice.” Resolution 1593 is a clear 
example of the Council’s ultra vires action disregarding norms of international law.97 
   Paragraph 6 of the Resolution purports to exclude jurisdiction of the ICC over “nationals, 
current or former officials or personnel from a contributing state outside Sudan which is not a 
party to the Rome Statute.”98 The inclusion of this provision, sponsored by the United States,99 
precludes the jurisdiction of any court other than one in the suspect’s nation-state to investigate 
and prosecute crimes under international law. In other words, for example, U.S. personnel 
accused of war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity (among other norms of jus cogens) 
can only be held accountable by a domestic court in the United States. Therefore, Resolution 
1593 is a mixed blessing. It creates space for the Court to protect human rights,
100
 but in a rather 
selective and biased manner. 
   The inclusion of Paragraph 6 conflicts with the ICC mission on two levels. First, it is crucial to 
understand that under Article 13, the Security Council creates jurisdiction for the court to 
investigate any crimes committed in the country at issue, regardless of whether it is a member of 
the ICC. In this respect, the ICC is in the position to investigate and prosecute any suspected 
individual in Sudan, irrespective of nationality, due to the jurisdiction created by the Security 
Council resolution, also known as ratione loci jurisdiction under Article 12.
101 
This means that 
military personnel involved in the situation of Sudan, such as U.S. soldiers, are technically under 
the jurisdiction of the Court since they are present in a state’s territory where the ICC has 
jurisdiction. 
   Secondly, this provision, also used in the case of Liberia in 2003,
102
 is contrary to customary 
law, which is binding upon all members of the United Nations including the United States (also 
known as jus cogens norms). For example, as legal scholar William Schabas demonstrates, the 
four Geneva Conventions
103
 oblige state parties to “search for persons alleged to have committed 
or to have ordered to be committed, grave breaches and to bring such persons, regardless of their 
nationality, before its own courts.”104 The four Geneva Conventions included in the Rome 
Statute would allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Article 12. Yet 
Resolution 1593 indicates the opposite. 
   Regardless of some doubts expressed in Security Council meetings in relation to Paragraph 6, 
questions remain about how much political interference the ICC can tolerate.
105
 Countries like 
Brazil argued that Paragraph 6 was “a legal exception that is inconsistent with international 
law.”106 On the other hand, Mrs. Patterson, the United States’ Ambassador, defended the 
resolution indicating that it “provides clear protections for United States persons. No United 
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States person supporting the operations in the Sudan will be subjected to investigation or 
prosecution because of this resolution.”107 Indeed, the implications of Paragraph 6 will not 
legally affect any national of the United States, Russia, China, Israel, or any other non-signatory 
state nationals in Sudan. However, it damages the principles of international law and effective 
protection of human rights. It is also a setback to the ICC’s legitimacy since the correct 
functioning of the Rome Statute is corrupted by national interest and realpolitik by the permanent 
members of the Security Council and their allies. 
   While Resolution 1593 does create jurisdiction for the ICC to prosecute those responsible for 
human rights violations in Darfur, Paragraph 6 undermines the de facto independence of the ICC. 
The prosecutor, to whom the deferral is delivered, had the responsibility to challenge the validity 
of the Resolution in light of Paragraph 6.
108
 His incompetence and failure to note the exclusion 
of ratione loci jurisdiction from the resolution and to disagree over the referral jeopardizes the 
credibility of the Court and its independence from the Security Council. Indeed, Resolution 1593 
is incompatible with the Rome Statute and its provisions, making the referral of Sudan illegal. 
   Hence, serious concerns about the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
remain unanswered. Despite progress made at the Rome Conference, the political status quo 
abrogates human rights protection mechanisms; this creates another situation of victor’s justice 
with which international tribunals continue to be associated.
109
 As legal scholar Cherif Bassiouni 
asserts, “The principal obstacles to the effectiveness of the ICC will always be realpolitik and 
states’ interests. Even in the era of globalism and the emergence of an influential international 
civil society.”110 If the ICC engages in investigations in which the jurisdictional questions are not 
resolved first, it could threaten all the progress made in the last fifty years and further fail to 
protect victims of oppressive regimes. “It is high time,” Cassese argues, “for the ICC to become 
more alert to the current and pressing demands of international justice.”111 
   Therefore, for the ICC to become a true enforcer of global justice, it must become independent 
of national interests. The role of emerging nations, as with the case of Brazil, might help to 
rebalance the current world order into one that fosters the ICC’s values accordingly. 
 
V.  Seeking Global Reform: The Role of Emerging Nations 
 
The call for reforming international organizations is not new. The last reform made to the United 
Nations Security Council occurred in 1965, when the number of members expanded from eleven 
to fifteen.
112
 In 1997, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan envisioned 
reforming the United Nations, but had little political support.
113
 However, the geopolitical status 
quo has changed in the last ten years. The capitalist crisis in the United States and Europe has 
weakened the position that these hegemonic powers exerted in the past. 
   In this context, Brazil, Russia, India, and China appear as major world players in a shifting 
political scenario thanks to their emerging economic power.
114
 According to Goldman Sachs’ 
Jim O’Neil (creator of the acronym BRIC), China could overtake the United States by 2027 and 
the BRICs combined could overtake the G7 by 2032.
115
 At the BRIC Sanya Summit in April 
2011, it was reported by envoys of these nations that BRICs’ leaders have consulted on major 
international issues, seeking to have a “common voice on some urgent problems ahead of the 
world community.”116 
   Recently, the BRIC nations have acted jointly on two decisive instances. On February 27, 
2011, the BRICs, represented in their totality in the Security Council, agreed to refer Libya’s 
situation to the ICC.
117
 In the last days of September 2011, China and Brazil offered to buy part 
of the sovereign debt of debt-troubled European countries.
118
 In addition, the BRICs have 
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indicated their willingness to flow capital to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These 
actions are a clear sign of international repositioning in the world-system. In the context of the 
G-20, the BRICs have called repeatedly for the reformation of the IMF and the World Bank. 
Brazil has also pointed out its intention to win a permanent seat on the Security Council.
119
 
Similarly, India’s desires to be a permanent member of the Council were endorsed by President 
Obama during his visit in November 2010.
120
 
   Therefore, new international actors have the ability to rebalance the current world order and 
trigger reform in international institutions, such as the United Nations, its Security Council, and 
the ICC. Global reform could detach the ICC completely from the Security Council, which 
proved detrimental in the case of Darfur. As seen during the negotiations of the ICC, a coalition 
of like-minded states
121
 might foster reform. The BRICs, especially Brazil, might lead the way to 
future global rebalancing that prioritizes global justice. 
 
VI.  Reshaping Global Justice: For a Multipolar Platform 
 
The emergence of new geopolitical actors, such as the BRIC nations, has influenced international 
relations considerably. The prowess and strength of their economies have obliged influential 
nations to pay special attention to them.
122
 According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council, 
“in terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power 
now under way, roughly from West to East, is without precedent in modern history.”123 Indeed, 
Goldman Sachs forecasts that, “in less than 40 years, the BRICs’ economies together could be 
larger than the G-6 in US dollar terms.”124 One sign of the BRICs’ clear path to economic power 
is their crucial role in the current world economic recovery efforts.
125
 The BRICs have led the 
way on financial recovery, providing “45% of economic growth worldwide”126 since the 
financial crises began in 2007. Consequently, Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, 
affirmed that, “The developing world is becoming the driver of the global economy.”127 China, 
India, and Brazil returned to the trend of growth more rapidly than most emerging and developed 
markets.
128
 However, the power and unity of the BRICs is not solely economic. 
   Since 2006, the BRICs have consulted on major international issues aiming at a process of 
global rebalancing. As Jan Nederveen Pieterse of Maastricht University argues, the BRICs, as 
countries representing the majority of the world population present at the global head table, 
could lead to a form of emancipatory politics.
129
 In other words, a scenario of multipolarity could 
provoke economic and political compromises, sharing the decision-making power with the South 
and East. In the economic realm, according to BRICs expert Cynthia Roberts, “all four rising 
powers have resisted requirements imposed by Western institutions.”130 They have pushed an 
agenda of “democratization of international relations,”131 calling for IMF and World Bank 
reform.
132 
   On the other hand, in the political arena, the BRIC nations in the Security Council supported 
resuming Palestinian-Israeli negotiations “aiming at the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian State.”133 However, the approach of noninterference134 in respect to the situation in 
Syria and Iran has disappointed many human rights practitioners. The Chinese and Russian 
officials have been reticent in allowing the Security Council to pass a resolution invoking 
Chapter VII mechanisms in both cases. It is still unclear what the position of the BRICs would be 
if conditions continue to deteriorate in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the Security Council 
referral of Libya to the ICC could be seen as a positive achievement of a multipolar world- 
system. Given that both China and Russia have veto powers, the BRIC’s agreement in upholding 
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international law punishing perpetrators could yield an important precedent in their relationship 
with the ICC. 
   In this context, Brazil, as the only ICC member of the BRICs, can lead the process 
strengthening the independence of the Court. As a result of the strong leadership of former 
President Ignacio Lula Da Silva and Foreign Minister Celso Amorin, Brazil is recognized today 
as an important global actor.
135
 Thanks to an intense diplomatic activism that opened more than 
33 embassies since 2003,
136
 Brazil has built relationships with the South American region
137
 as 
well as with African and Asian countries.
138
 Brazil’s multilateral policies are also present within 
the structure of the U.N. Responding to the earthquake in Haiti, Brazil showed strong leadership 
in the humanitarian mission and efforts to rebuild the Caribbean nation.
139
 In addition, Brazil has 
historically pursued the reformation of the Security Council to obtain a permanent seat.
140
 
Current President Dilma Rousseff made this clear at the 66th U.N. General Assembly, 
demanding that the Council “reflects contemporary realities”141 and asserting that, “Brazil is 
ready to shoulder its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Council.”142 
   The combination of Brazil’s membership in the ICC, active involvement in multilateral 
relations, U.N. actions, and objective to reform the Security Council can foster conditions that 
are in line with the founding values of the ICC. Brazil’s involvement in international politics at 
the level of the Security Council and other U.N. agencies brings the concerns of emerging 
nations onto the agenda. Backed by the BRICs’ Security Council veto-members and other 
emerging nations, Brazil could exert political pressure and undertake a process of revision of the 
current structure of the Security Council. This could detach the Council from the workings of the 
ICC. Ideally, a review conference on the Rome Statute would revise the agreement between the 
Court and the U.N. Security Council. Correcting loose judicial mechanisms open to political 
manipulation would strengthen the International Criminal Court’s independence in protecting 
international human rights law. 
 
VII.  Lessons and Final Remarks 
 
The delicate relationship between the ICC and the Security Council examined in this essay 
shows the detrimental effects of power politics in the realm of international law and the 
enforcement of human rights. The case of Darfur’s Resolution 1593 is a clear example of 
politicized justice contrary to a cosmopolitan model advanced by the idea of global justice. As 
Franceschet argues, a cosmopolitan model supported by emerging nations envisages the 
“responsibility of an international community enforcing international law against (would-be) 
violators that abuse their sovereign prerogatives”143 As stated by the ICC prosecutor, states must 
adapt to new developments in international norms to guarantee the protection of basic human 
rights and international security as pursued by the ICC. Improved notions of international law 
should guide the global community in ensuring the punishment and prosecution of violations of 
human rights. The cosmopolitan model based on global justice might be possible with the 
detachment of the ICC from politicized institutions such as the Security Council. Committed 
human rights respecting nations, such as the Netherlands, might join emerging governments, 
such as Brazil, in pushing forward an agenda of global justice reform based on a cosmopolitan 
model. Therefore, looking at the project of global justice and cosmopolitanism advanced by the 
ICC and emerging nations, the foregoing analysis leads to several lessons.  
   First, Resolution 1953 does not operate in a socio-political vacuum. The current world order 
allows mass atrocities to remain unpunished and unresolved. As explained in this study, the 
uneven processes of globalization widen inequalities, ranging from economic and social to 
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political deprivations, which undermine the respect for human rights. Stipulated in Article 28 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the current world order has not been a viable 
environment for global justice. In fact, institutions such as the ICC, entrusted with the project of 
global justice, are vulnerable to political manipulation by old centers of power resisting reform, 
like the U.N. Security Council. The manipulation of the judicial mechanism by the Security 
Council illustrated in the case of Resolution 1593 has impeded the Court from functioning 
efficiently to enhance global justice. 
   Secondly, despite political interference, the ICC role in fostering international peace and 
security has become more evident. Libya’s referral to the Court, backed by emerging nations 
such as Brazil and India, is an indicator of the ICC’s validity in international politics. Moreover, 
the Court’s efforts are widely seen by emerging nations as a positive force for global justice. For 
example, Brazil’s objection to Resolution 1593 (calling it contrary to international law) shows 
the willingness to reform the current political order. In addition, at the moment of this writing, a 
Kenyan High Court has ordered the government to enforce the arrest warrant on Omar al-Bashir 
if he ever enters Kenyan territory.
144
 Therefore, despite issues of obstruction, the ICC has an 
intact potential to become the guardian of global justice if state parties align themselves with the 
objective of ending impunity,
145
 as recently deceased Antonio Cassese promoted throughout his 
life.
146
 
   The third lesson is concerned with the urgent need to reform the current world-order and its 
institutions, such as the Security Council. Here, the role of emerging nations is crucial in pushing 
for improvement and enhancing a process of global rebalancing. The BRICs, with Brazil leading, 
have the capacity to forge structural changes inside the Security Council thanks to their 
economic power and multilateral policies. This, in addition to the recent developments on the 
election of a new prosecutor for the ICC,
147
 could be a starting point to revise and open new 
opportunities for reform. 
   These lessons shed some light on one of the many facets of achieving global justice; however, 
several avenues remain open for future research. One such question is exploring future 
amendments to the Rome Statute. The Kenyan government has initiated a process of revising 
Article 16 of the Statute to allow giving the prerogative to the General Assembly to defer a case 
when the Security Council cannot reach agreement.
148
 Although the author completely disagrees 
with the proposed reform, he finds the initiative positive because the relationship with the 
Security Council is addressed at some level. Examining the possibility of a complete detachment 
of the Court from the United Nations system is an opportunity for further research. 
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